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Pursuant to Rule 35A of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
and the Supreme Court's Notice in this matter dated August 21,
1992,

the

respondent

Transportation

State

("UDOT"),

of

submits

Utah,
the

Utah

Department

following

of

Answer

to

Appellants1 Petition for Rehearing.
INTRODUCTION
This case involves an action for damages for the wrongful
deaths of several persons who were killed when their car collided
with a Union Pacific train. Suit was brought against the railroad
for negligent

operation of its train and maintenance of the

crossing, and against the Utah Department of Transportation for not
sooner having installed lights and gates. The crossing, along with
hundreds of others in the State of Utah, had been the subject of
an engineering study by the UDOT and was scheduled for eventual
upgrade. Because of financial constraints, however, that crossing,
and many others, had not been upgraded before the plaintiffs1
accident.
After discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants, entering an extensive and wellreasoned Memorandum Opinion in support of the granting of the
Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiffs

appealed

to the Utah

Court

of Appeals which

affirmed, Duncan v. Union Pacific, 790 P.2d 595 (Ut.App. 1990).
Plaintiffs petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for a Writ of
Certiorari, which was granted.

After briefing and argument, the

Utah Supreme Court on April 6 of this year affirmed (Justices
Stewart and Durham dissenting).
The accident occurred in 1983; this case has been the subject
of judicial scrutiny by the Utah courts for nearly a decade. After
extensive discovery, briefing and argument, it has been decided by
no fewer than seven Utah jurists that the plaintiffs are not
entitled to recover.
There is, after all, something to be said for finality of
judgments, and a rehearing in a case which has received as much
attention as this one should rarely be granted in absence of some
rather egregious judicial oversight. Thus, Rule 35, Utah Rules of
Appellate

Procedure,

requires

that

a Petition

for

Rehearing

"shall state with particularity the points of law or fact which
the petitioner claims the Court has overlooked or misapprehended
• . . • it

Appellants1 Petition for Rehearing asserts that the majority
of this court overlooked or misapprehended controlling law as it
relates to:

(1) whether decisions regarding traffic control

devices at railroad crossings are the exercise of a governmental
function; (2) whether the UDOT exercised "discretion"; (3) whether
the waiver of immunity found in Section 63-30-8 is qualified by the
discretionary function exception to the waiver of immunity in
Section

63-30-10;

and

(4)

whether

the

Court's

opinion

is

inconsistent with what the plaintiff describes as "laudatory tort
theories and public policy concerns such as compensating parties
injured through no fault of their own, and deterring hazardous
-2-

conditions by holding negligent [governmental] entities responsible
for the blameworthy conduct,"
Contrary to appellants' assertions, however, the majority of
this Court did indeed take note of the controlling law and relevant
facts, and did not misapprehend or overlook either,
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION
The

majority

opinion

properly

concluded

that

decisions

relating to the types of warning devices to be installed at
railroad crossings involve the exercise of discretion, for which
immunity is retained by Section 63-30-10(1) of the Governmental
Immunity Act.

To reach that conclusion, the court, of necessity,

had to conclude that such activities were also the exercise of a
"governmental function."

Otherwise, the discretionary function

question need not have been addressed.
Assuming
nevertheless

that

the

issue

the majority

was

not

waived

opinion acknowledged

by

appellants,

the issue and

reached the proper conclusion, citing, inter alia, Richards v.
Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 (Utah 1985).x

Standiford v. Salt Lake City

Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980), does not require a different
result.
It is important to keep in mind that the Standiford test is
a disjunctive proposition:

the test for determining "governmental

function" is "whether the activity under consideration is of such

^Holding that the presentation of a timely Notice of Claim was
required, which, of course, it would not have been if the activity
in question (maintenance of traffic signs) was not "governmental."
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a unique nature that it can only be performed by a governmental
agency or that
activity-"
crossings

herein

are

governmental

Arguably, decisions relating to upgrading railroad
are

activity."2

it is essential to the core of

not

"essential

to

the

core

of

governmental

However, it is clear that the activities involved
of

such

a unique

nature

that

they

can only be

effectively performed, as a practical matter, by a governmental
agency.
In

interpreting

the

somewhat

vague

direction

given

by

Standiford, subsequent decisions of this Court have made it clear
that recreational activities, such as the operation of a golf
course or a sledding hill, are not "governmental" (Standiford;
Johnson v. Salt Lake City, 629 P.2d 432). The Court has also found
activity to be not governmental when it is the type of activity
which can be, and in fact is, carried out effectively by a
nongovernmental agency such as, for example, supplying culinary
water or collection of sewage (Bennett v. Bow Valley Development,
797 P.2d 419 (Utah 1990); Thomas v. Clearfield City, 642 P.2d 737
(1982)). In reaching those conclusions, the Court noted that there
was nothing uniquely governmental about such activities, nor was
it

even

mandatory

that

a governmental

entity

perform

those

functions. The same cannot be said, however, of the activities of

2

Indeed, it is difficult to divine what sort of activity would
be so "essential," short, perhaps, of collecting taxes and
enacting, and enforcing laws.
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the UDOT in the instant case. As noted by the Court of Appeals in
Gleave v. Denver and Rio Grande, supra:
UDOT is statutorily empowered to "provide for the
installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and improving
of automatic and other safety appliances, signals or
devices at grade crossings," Utah Code Annotated § 544-15.1 (1986), and to apportion costs of such projections
among public and private entities, Utah Code Annotated,
§ 54-4-15.3 (1986).
The government alone must
consistently regulate safety devices at railroad
crossings, determine which devices at which crossings
should be recommended for federal funding, rank crossings
in order of need for upgrading in light of limited funds
for that purpose, and apportion signal installation costs
between public and private entities. As a practical
matter, the private sector cannot perform these
functions. Accordingly, we hold that the regulation of
public safety needs and the evaluation, installation,
maintenance and improvement of safety signals or devices
at railroad crossings is a governmental function
immunized from suit under Section 63-30-3 of the Act.
(Emphasis added.)
Neither the railroad nor any other nongovernmental entity has
the power to determine what types of safety devices should be
installed at railroad crossings. The mere fact that the UDOT may,
within its discretion, require the railroad or some other involved
entity to contribute toward the cost of the improvement does not
detract from the fundamental doctrine, which is that activities and
decisions which will impact on the citizenry at large, involve the
prioritization of scarce financial resources, require consistency
and uniformity, and deal with the safety of the traveling public,
are, and must be, "governmental."
Certainly it is true that there are some activities engaged
in by the government which are not "governmental functions," such
as the operation of a golf course, the maintenance of a sewage
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system, supervision of disbursement

of escrow funds, and the

maintenance of a water supply system, all of which activities can
be, and are, engaged in by private individuals. One looks in vain,
however, for private individuals and companies who are engaged in
long-range urban and demographic projections, the planning of
highway

systems,

condemnation

of

property,

and

design,

construction, and maintenance of highways, bridges, interchanges,
railroad crossings, and similar structures.3
This Court has both impliedly and expressly held that design,
construction

and

maintenance

governmental function.

of

public

thoroughfares

is

a

If such activities are not governmental,

then the Court need never have discussed the necessity of a Notice
of Claim, or whether the activity involved was "discretionary," as
in Richards v. Leavitt, supra; Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50
(Utah 1980); Valesguez v. Union Pacific Railroad, 469 P.2d 5
(1970); Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975); Carroll v.
State Road Commission, 496 P.2d 888 (1972); Sears v. Southworth,
563 P.2d 192 (Utah 1977); See also, Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 111
P.2d 800 (Utah 1941); Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 228 P. 213 (Utah
1924) .
Indeed, no other result is reasonable.

To simplistically

conclude that if some other entity could perform roughly the same
function, that function is thus not "governmental," simply means

3

The UDOT is responsible for approximately 43,000 miles of
public highways in the State of Utah, which accommodate 14.6
billion vehicle miles of travel each year. UDOT Office of Policy
and Systems Planning, Annual Statistical Summary (November 1991).
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that there are virtually no activities of government which will be
"governmental,"

as,

obviously,

nearly

every

activity

which

government undertakes could conceivably be undertaken by private
persons.

The fact that railroads may once upon a time have had

more responsibility for the maintenance of crossings is irrelevant,
as is the fact that in the early days of some states there were no
public roads, but only private roads, for the use of which tolls
were charged.
the

Yet, in the real world, in twentieth-century Utah,

government

has

assumed,

and

the

citizens

expect,

that

government will be responsible, ultimately, for the State's highway
transportation system.

Clearly, the activity here at issue is

"governmental," as it can only be, as a practical matter, performed
by a governmental agency.

Such conclusion is in no way contrary

to the rationale of Standiford; the majority opinion reaches the
correct and rational result, and is consistent with the Utah cases
on the subject.
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION
The

majority

of

the

Court

neither

overlooked

nor

misapprehended the facts or the controlling case law relating to
the discretionary function issue. The majority opinion properly
applied the four-part test of Little v. Department of Family
Services,

667

P. 2d 49

(Utah

1983),

and

found

that

a basic

governmental objective was involved (the promotion of public safety
at railroad crossings), that the activity (prioritization) was
essential to the realization of the objective, that the UDOT
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exercised basic policy evaluation, judgment and expertise, and that
the UDOT, obviously, had the necessary statutory authority.
Appellants, however, continue to assert, as they did in their
original brief, that the UDOT had decided to upgrade the crossing
but

"tragically

failed to implement

this decision

. . . ."

Appellants would, apparently, have this court believe that the
UDOT, after deciding that the crossing needed to be immediately
upgraded, simply sort of forgot to get around to doing what they
had decided needed to be done immediately.

Such is simply not the

case. As was clearly established, the crossing in question was one
of hundreds of crossings which were deserving of being upgraded.
After an engineering study and a comparison of railroad crossings
in the state needing improvement, this particular crossing was not
rated high enough on the priority list so that it would be upgraded
before the accident.

To contend that deferring the upgrading of

this particular crossing until other, more deserving, crossings had
been upgraded constituted a negligent "failure to implement" is,
to be charitable, illogical.*

*The following example may be helpful in illustrating the
logical flaw in appellants1 argument. First, it must be remembered
that every railroad crossing is "dangerous" to some degree, as is
every highway, be it two-lane rural road or state-of-the-art
Interstate. Interstate highways are, presumably, safer than twolane rural highways, and a railroad crossing with train-activated
gates and lights is, presumably, safer than a crossing which has
only the standard warning devices as were present in the instant
case. Assuming that the UDOT has long-range plans, but no present
funding, to upgrade two-lane highways to Interstate standards, is
the UDOT to be held accountable for a head-on accident on a twolane road because a decision was made to construct the Interstate
in one area as opposed to the area where the accident occurred?
Appellants apparently so contend.
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While appellants contend that the Court ignored or overlooked
relevant authority in concluding that the UDOT's activities under
attack herein were "discretionary," it is respectfully submitted
that the majority of the Court properly applied the controlling
Utah cases. The Utah courts, over the years, have attempted to set
forth what types of activities are discretionary and which are
nondiscretionary.

It has been held that the following decisions

are "nondiscretionary":

to use an earthen berm as the sole method

of warning travelers of a cut in an abandoned road (Carroll v.
State

Road

Commission,

supra);

preparation

of

plans

and

specifications and supervision of the manner in which construction
work was carried out (Andrus v. State, supra); psychiatric care of
an

individual

(Frank

v.

State,

613

P.2d

517

(Utah

1980));

installation of defective traffic control semaphore system (Bigelow
v. Ingersoll, supra); negligent operation of a backhoe (Irvine v.
Salt Lake County, 123 U.A.R. 11 (1989)).

On the other hand, the

following types of decisions have been held to be discretionary:
decisions to build a highway and the general location thereof
(Andrus v. State, supra); decisions regarding the design, capacity
and construction of a flood control system (Rocky Mountain Thrift
v. Salt Lake City, 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989)); decisions relating
to when to release a prisoner on work release (Epting v. State, 546
P.2d 242 (Utah 1976)); the decision to require health inspections
(Wilcox v. Salt Lake City, 484 P.2d 78 (Utah 1971)); failure to
close a business under the Occupational Health and Safety Laws
(White v. State, 579 P.2d 921 (1978)); and, of course, decisions
-9-

relating to installation of traffic control devices at railroad
crossings (Valesguez v. Union Pacific Railroad, supra; Gleave v,
Denver and Rio Grande, 749 P.2d 660 (Ut.App. 1988); Duncan v. Union
Pacific Railroad, 790 P.2d 595 (Ut.App. 1990)).
Appellants argue that Rocky Mountain Thrift v. Salt Lake City,
supra, is not controlling, since the design of a flood control
system is unlike the decisions made by the UDOT in the instant case
relating to prioritization of railroad crossings.

Appellants1

primary criticism is that the UDOTfs surveillance team applied a
"rigid mathematical formula . . . in prioritizing crossings," and
that the use of the formula in some fashion distinguishes this case
from Rocky Mountain Thrift v. Salt Lake City, supra. However, the
UDOT should not be criticized for using an objective formula,
regardless of whether it was rigid or mechanical. The use of such
a formula attempts, to the extent possible, to reach rational,
cost-effective conclusions based upon objective facts.

As the

majority opinion noted, M[T]he public is better served by a system
such as that devised by UDOT, which takes into consideration all
the crossings in Utah."5

s

Appellants cite a Federal District Court case as an example
of yet another case rejecting the discretionary function immunity
for decisions relating to railroad crossing devices, citing Armjo
v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, 754 F.Supp. 1526
(D.C. N.M. 1990). That case, however, is totally irrelevant as
interpreting dissimilar provisions of the New Mexico Governmental
Immunity Act. Based upon the peculiar provisions thereof, the
Federal Court merely observed that "from the Courtfs cursory look
at this issue, it appears that the State of New Mexico would
probably not enjoy sovereign immunity for these claims." In any
event, the State of New Mexico was not even a party to the action,
and the primary issue was the preemptive effect of the Federal
Railroad Safety Act.
-10-

Presumably, appellants would not be happy with any formula,
rigid or otherwise, unless that particular formula had moved the
crossing in question to the top of the priority list.

There is,

of course, no assurance that such would have occurred no matter
what formula was used, and the appellants' argument is dependent
on speculation and twenty-twenty hindsight.
reached the right conclusion.

The majority opinion

It is obvious that the activities

of the UDOT herein complained of involve the rationing of scarce
financial resources, the necessary prioritization

of railroad

crossing upgrading, and the exercise of basic policy evaluation,
judgment and expertise in pursuit of a worthy, basic governmental
objective.
In a perfect world, all railroad crossings would have been
upgraded many years ago, and neither the plaintiffs1 accident, nor
any other similar accident, would ever have occurred.

In the real

world, with limited resources and a large number of railroad
crossings, it is fundamentally unjust to impose liability on the
UDOT simply because it did the best it could, using an objectively
rational

method,

to

prioritize

railroad

crossing

upgrades.

Plaintiffs, of course, merely argue that some other system should
have been used, evidencing no concern that a premature upgrading
of their

crossing would

delay upgrading

somewhere

else, and

increase the possibility of another accident as bad or worse than
the plaintiffs'.
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A.

The discretionary function exception of Section 63-30-10(1)
modifies the waiver of immunity found in Section 63-30-8.
Appellants assert that Richards v. Leavitt, supra, stands for

the notion that the waiver of immunity found in Section 8 for
dangerous roads, bridges, etc., stands on its own and is not
qualified by Section 10, which retains immunity for the exercise
of a discretionary function. However, Richards v. Leavitt does not
stand for the proposition claimed by appellants, and as noted by
the majority

opinion,

held only that

the maintenance

of an

intersection and a stop sign were governmental functions, and a
timely notice of claim was required under the Governmental Immunity
Act; the question of discretionary function was not reached.
A

number

of

cases,

however,

have

assumed

that

the

discretionary function exception to liability will apply in claims
involving an alleged dangerous road or highway. If Section 10 does
not qualify Section 8, then there was no reason for this Court to
discuss what is, and what is not, a discretionary function in, for
example, Andrus v. state, Bigelow v. Ingersoll, Valesguez v. Union
Pacific Railroad, Carroll v. State Road Commission, or Rocky
Mountain Thrift v. Salt Lake City, supra.
The majority opinion did not misapprehend or overlook the
controlling

authorities

and,

established law of this state.

indeed,

properly

applied

the

In any event, if there was ever

any doubt that Section 10 was meant to qualify Section 8, those
doubts have been

laid to rest by the
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1991 clarification of

Section 8 which now specifically provides that it is qualified by
the "exceptions to waiver set forth in Section 63-3-10."
B.

The majority opinion does not overlook the cumulative effect
of its ruling, and it is consistent with public policy.
Appellants' argument in Point II of the Petition for Rehearing

is simply an appeal to emotion.
victims:

It portrays the plaintiffs as

widows and orphans simply seeking just compensation for

their emotional and financial

loss from the State and a big

railroad company for dangerous conditions "intentionally created
because of monetary considerations."

It is asserted that the

result "unjustly denies recovery to the plaintiffs and to all
future plaintiffs who find themselves similarly situated."

While

it is true that recovery will be denied to the plaintiffs herein,
such a result is not necessarily "unjust."

Appellants seem to

forget that this unfortunate accident occurred only after the
plaintiffs1 vehicle drove onto the main line of the Union Pacific
Railroad after disregarding warning signs which were visible in
their headlights for at least one-half mile; further, that the
train which struck the plaintiffs1 vehicle could have been seen up
the track for many thousands

of feet and,

in addition, was

displaying a 300,000-candlepower headlight and a rotary beam on the
top of the engine.

A driver as apparently inattentive as the

plaintiffs1 driver may very likely not have been saved by the
enhanced warning system for which the plaintiffs so earnestly
contend.
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Under the circumstances of this case, it is not unjust to
relieve the UDOT of liability to the plaintiffs.
injustice would be

to impose

Indeed, the

liability on the UDOT and the

taxpayers of this state merely because the UDOT, through the
application of an objective engineering study, determined that
there were other railroad crossings more in need of expensive gates
and lights than the one at which the subject accident occurred.
CONCLUSION
There is no basis for the granting of the appellants1 Petition
for Rehearing.

A rehearing is only appropriate if in fact the

Court has overlooked or misapprehended some relevant points of law
or fact.

The majority opinion accurately stated the fundamental

facts and applied well-established law.

Appellants1 Petition for

Rehearing is merely a rehash of arguments previously made, enhanced
by some quotes from the dissenting opinion.

The Petition for

Rehearing does not set forth any valid reason for subjecting the
parties and the Court to yet more briefing and argument.
Petition should be denied.
DATED this

%

day of

So^gV^J^v

1992.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By

(/MA**

L. Larson
for Respondent
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